João Pedro Sousa (grasp’s scholar in European Union Regulation on the College of Regulation of the College of Minho)
1. Preliminary concerns
Judicial independence is a elementary pillar of the rule of regulation enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It ensures that judges are free from exterior pressures – whether or not from the chief, legislative branches, or personal pursuits –, permitting them to adjudicate circumstances impartially and pretty. Within the European Union (EU) context, judicial independence transcends the inner affairs of Member States; it’s an important safeguard to make sure the total utility of EU regulation and efficient judicial safety. The Courtroom of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has persistently emphasised that nationwide courts act as “European courts”,[1] making use of and upholding EU regulation inside their jurisdictions. Consequently, any impairment to the judicial independence in a Member State poses a nationwide constitutional difficulty and a direct risk to the European authorized order.[2]
The current joined circumstances C-146/23 (Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku) and C-374/23[3] (Adoreikė) come at a pivotal second as considerations over the rule of regulation rise in sure Member States. These joined circumstances addressed whether or not budgetary measures impacting the remuneration of judges in Poland and Lithuania, launched by way of nationwide laws, violated EU regulation by undermining judicial independence. Their significance is heightened by the truth that they coincide with the seventh anniversary of the “Portuguese Judges” judgment [Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas (ASJP)],[4] a landmark case that firmly established judicial independence as a elementary factor of the rule of regulation beneath EU regulation. As highlighted in a current evaluation on this weblog, understanding the legacy of the “Portuguese Judges” judgment is crucial to contextualising the challenges dealing with the judiciary at present.[5]
Consistent with the evolution of its case regulation, the CJEU’s judgment within the joined circumstances C-146/23 and C-374/23 reaffirmed that whereas Member States retain discretion over the organisation of their judicial programs, that is bounded by the Union’s elementary values together with efficient judicial safety beneath Article 19(1) second subparagraph TEU, as a result of the Member States are required to adjust to their obligations deriving from EU regulation. To that extent the “Portuguese Judges” judgment demonstrated that budgetary constraints might justify sure changes to the remuneration of judges if they’re non permanent, proportionate, and a part of public-sector expenditure measures.[6] Nevertheless, the important thing difficulty in C-146/23 and C-374/23 is whether or not such measures, regardless of being non permanent and linked to socio-economic context, could be considered impartial public-sector insurance policies or in the event that they expose a extra refined type of political interference masked as fiscal restraint.
This article is going to critically look at the authorized penalties of the joined circumstances C-146/23 and C-374/23, discover how they construct upon the “Portuguese Judges” case, and additional outline the boundaries between authentic nationwide discretion and illegal interference on judicial independence. Finally, it would deal with a central difficulty: to what extent can budgetary restriction measures affecting judges’ remuneration be justified with out crossing the road into violations of the rule of regulation beneath EU regulation?
2. Authorized and factual context
The joined circumstances C-146/23 and C-374/23 arose from authorized challenges introduced by judges in Poland and Lithuania in regards to the remuneration of judges. The central difficulty in each circumstances revolves across the interpretation of Article 2 and Article 19(1) TEU, in addition to Article 47 of the Constitution of Basic Rights of the European Union (CFREU) – on the appropriate to an efficient judicial treatment, which should be duly considered for the needs of deciphering the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (paras. 1 and 43) – within the context of nationwide measures affecting judges’ remuneration and judicial independence.
In C-146/23, the dispute involved the Polish choose XL, who contested the tactic used to calculate his remuneration. Beneath Article 91(1c) of the Polish Regulation on the Organisation of Abnormal Courts, judges’ remuneration was historically tied to the common wage for the second quarter of the previous yr. Nevertheless, this mechanism was amended thrice: for 2021, the calculation referred to 2019 salaries (as an alternative of 2020); for 2022, the 2020 determine was used, with a minimal improve of 26 Polish zlotys (roughly EUR 6); and in 2023, the remuneration was dissociated from the statistical calculation, relying as an alternative on a primary quantity set by the Polish legislature. The Polish Authorities justified these derogations by invoking the financial scenario attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, the battle in Ukraine, and the ensuing rise in power costs (paras. 10-21). The referring Polish court docket expressed considerations that the sustained freezing of judges’ salaries for 3 years and the abandonment in 2023 of the mechanism for figuring out their remuneration based mostly on the common wage of the second quarter of the previous yr undermine the appropriate of judges to obtain remuneration decided by goal standards, impartial of arbitrary choices by the legislature, and in keeping with the dignity of their workplace. It additionally famous that whereas the freezing of salaries was initially meant to be non permanent, its extension for 2023 demonstrates the intention to completely cut back judges’ remuneration. Moreover, the referring Polish court docket argued that any intervention within the functioning and organisation of the judiciary ought to solely happen exceptionally and end result from concerted motion by each the legislature and the judiciary to keep away from arbitrary interference by the chief and legislature, which undermines judicial independence (paras. 17-19).
In C-374/23, Lithuanian judges SR and RB equally challenged the discretion afforded to the legislature and govt in figuring out their remuneration. Their salaries, calculated beneath the Regulation on the Remuneration of Judges (2008), had been based mostly on a base price set yearly by the Lithuanian Parliament on the Authorities’s proposal. This price couldn’t be decrease than the earlier yr’s however was adjusted in response to financial components corresponding to inflation charges, the minimal month-to-month wage, and the influence of different components affecting the extent and evolution of the common wage within the public sector (para. 7). The Republic of Lithuania contends that planning of the State finances and, specifically, of the speed of remuneration of public officers falls throughout the constitutional prerogatives of the Authorities. As well as, the bottom price of remuneration is about yearly in response to the assets and monetary constraints of the State, that means it couldn’t be elevated extra quickly (para. 24). The referring court docket states that the remuneration of the judges of the Regional Courts is calculated by multiplying the bottom price, which was EUR 181 in 2022 and EUR 186 in 2023, by a wage coefficient that has remained unchanged since 1 October 2013, apart from the judges of the District Courts (para. 25). The judges argued that this technique lacked secure and impartial standards, asserting that the dedication of their remuneration was topic to the political will of the chief and the legislature, thereby failing to look at, inter alia, the constitutional precept of judicial independence (paras. 22–23). The referring Lithuanian court docket questioned whether or not a nationwide system for the remuneration of judges, which is instantly depending on the political will of the legislature and the chief, is in keeping with EU regulation, significantly with the values protected by Article 2 TEU and Article 47 CFREU, thus elevating considerations about its compatibility with the assure judicial independence and the appropriate to an efficient treatment (paras. 29–30).
These circumstances had been constructed instantly on the muse laid within the “Portuguese Judges” judgment. In that case, the CJEU accepted non permanent and proportionate remuneration reductions for Portuguese judges as a part of broader austerity measures affecting the whole public sector throughout the monetary disaster. The query within the joined circumstances C-146/23 and C-374/23 was whether or not the Polish and Lithuanian measures may very well be equally justified or in the event that they crossed the road into impermissible interference with judicial independence (paras. 65-76).
3. Findings of the Courtroom
The CJEU, sitting because the Grand Chamber, reaffirmed the elemental precept that judicial independence is crucial to making sure the total utility of EU regulation and the judicial safety that people derive from EU regulation (para. 47). The Courtroom’s judgment rested on a meticulous interpretation of Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, learn along with Article 47 of the CFREU, reinforcing the concept that nationwide courts are additionally European courts tasked with making certain the total utility of EU regulation (paras. 46–48). The Courtroom drew a transparent distinction between authentic nationwide discretion in organising judicial programs, together with setting judges’ remuneration, and actions that violate EU regulation by compromising judicial independence.
The CJEU emphasised that whereas Member States retain the authority to organise their judicial programs, this discretion isn’t absolute. It should function throughout the boundaries set by EU regulation, significantly the duty to safeguard judicial independence. The Courtroom emphasised that judicial independence isn’t merely a proper idea however a substantive assure that requires judges to be free from exterior pressures, whether or not direct or oblique. This freedom consists of the receipt of a degree of remuneration commensurate with the significance of judicial features, because it constitutes a safeguard towards undue affect and a key factor in making certain impartiality, as beforehand said within the “Portuguese judges” judgment (para. 49).
The CJEU reaffirmed that any mechanism for figuring out judges’ remuneration should be goal, foreseeable, secure, and clear (para. 56). It additionally addressed the circumstances beneath which Member States might undertake budgetary restriction measures affecting judges’ remuneration. Whereas acknowledging that Member States might, in distinctive circumstances, impose such measures, the Courtroom set strict circumstances for his or her legitimacy (paras. 65-76). These measures should pursue an goal of normal curiosity, corresponding to eliminating an extreme authorities deficit, as recognised within the “Portuguese Judges” judgment. Nevertheless, the Courtroom was cautious to spotlight that these measures should not particularly goal the judiciary; somewhat, they need to type a part of broader reforms affecting the general public sector as an entire. Moreover, any budgetary restriction should be non permanent and proportionate to the goal pursued, making certain that judges’ monetary safety isn’t unduly compromised (paras. 67, 69, 73).
In assessing the Polish and Lithuanian measures on the coronary heart of the joined circumstances, the Courtroom scrutinised their compatibility with EU regulation, significantly the precept of judicial independence:
i) Concerning Poland, the Courtroom acknowledged the Polish Authorities’s justification for the remuneration measures relevant in 2022 and 2023, which derogated from Article 91(1c) of the Regulation on the Organisation of the Abnormal Courts. These derogations had been introduced as responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian Federation’s aggression towards Ukraine, and the ensuing improve in power costs (para. 78). The Courtroom noticed that the contested measures, set out on Article 8 of the Regulation accompanying the finances for 2022 and Article 8 of the Regulation accompanying the finances for 2023, particularly focused the remuneration of judges and prosecutors, which prima facie, may undermine the precept of judicial independence (para. 79). Nevertheless, having regard to the concerns set out in paragraphs 69 and 70 and the Polish Authorities proof, the Courtroom didn’t robotically conclude that these measures breached EU regulation. As a substitute, it instructed the referring court docket to determine whether or not these measures, whereas particularly geared toward judges, fashioned a part of broader budgetary restrictions that additionally affected different classes of officers or public servants. In response to the Polish Authorities proof, these measures may search to use, on a deferred foundation, to judges budgetary restrictions that had already been imposed on different public sector employees in earlier years (para. 79). Moreover, the Courtroom famous that, topic to verification by the referring court docket, the contested remuneration measures every utilized for just one yr. It noticed that these measures gave the impression to be distinctive and non permanent, as indicated by the truth that the mechanism for calculating remuneration was not repealed and was reinstated in 2024, as confirmed by the Polish Authorities and the Fee throughout the listening to earlier than the Courtroom (para. 80). Once more topic to verification by the referring court docket, additionally it is obvious that the remunerations freezes didn’t appear to scale back judges’ remuneration in absolute phrases; though there was a lack of buying energy, the remunerations had been frozen in 2021 however elevated by 4.37% in 2022 and seven.8% in 2023. When bonuses and exemptions from social safety contributions, amounting to almost 14% of gross remuneration, had been factored in, Polish judges’ remuneration reportedly remained thrice the nationwide common wage, as said by the Polish Authorities and the Fee (para. 81). One other vital level was the Courtroom’s acknowledgement of the provision of efficient judicial evaluate in Poland. The actual fact that the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku (District Courtroom, Białystok) referred the case for a preliminary ruling demonstrated that judges had entry to a judicial treatment to contest the wage measures (para. 82). Accordingly, topic to verification by the referring court docket, there isn’t any indication that Article 8 of the Regulation accompanying the finances for 2022 and Article 8 of the Regulation accompanying the finances for 2023, violated the necessities of judicial independence beneath the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, learn along with Article 2 TEU (para. 83).
ii) Turning to Lithuania, the Courtroom examined the system governing judges’ remuneration, which is predicated on a base price set yearly by the legislature and the chief. This price is adjusted in response to a set of goal standards, together with the annual inflation price for the previous yr, which is determined by the nationwide client worth index, the extent of the minimal month-to-month wage, and the influence of different components affecting the extent and evolution of the common wage within the public sector (para. 84). The Courtroom acknowledged that, topic to verification by the referring court docket, these guidelines gave the impression to be goal, foreseeable, secure, and clear, important safeguards for judicial independence (para. 84). Addressing considerations in regards to the adequacy of judges’ remuneration in Lithuania, the Courtroom reiterated that the evaluation should contemplate the financial, social, and monetary scenario of the MS and examine judges’ remuneration with the nationwide common wage (para. 85).[7] The Courtroom cited the 2022 report by the European Fee for the effectivity of justice (CEPEJ), which confirmed that in 2020, Lithuanian judges’ common gross wage originally of their profession was 2.1 instances the nationwide common, rising to 2.9 instances for judges of the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Supreme Courtroom of Lithuania) (para. 86). The Courtroom famous that whereas a 2019 tax reform had resulted in a nominal discount of judges’ remuneration, there was inadequate element within the referring court docket’s order to ascertain whether or not this undermined judicial independence (para. 87). Consequently, pending verification by the referring court docket, there isn’t any indication that the remuneration guidelines relevant to SR and RB throughout the related interval violated the precept of judicial independence (para. 88). Lastly, the reference for a preliminary ruling from the Regional Administrative Courtroom of Vilnius is ample to reveal the opportunity of efficient judicial evaluate of the contested wage measures (para. 89).
Finally, the Courtroom concluded that the precept of judicial independence doesn’t preclude nationwide measures to set or alter judges’ remuneration, supplied such measures meet particular standards. These measures should be lawful, clear, and non-arbitrary, with detailed guidelines which can be goal, foreseeable, secure, and proportionate to a authentic normal curiosity. The Courtroom additional clarified that even derogations from nationwide laws that freeze or cut back the remuneration of judges can adjust to EU regulation, as long as they’re based mostly on regulation, pursue an goal of normal curiosity, and type a part of broader public sector reforms somewhat than concentrating on judges particularly. Crucially, such measures should be distinctive, non permanent, and open to efficient judicial evaluate (para. 90).
In conclusion, the CJEU didn’t discover an computerized violation of judicial independence in both the Polish or Lithuanian case. As a substitute, it left the ultimate dedication to the referring courts, instructing them to confirm whether or not the remuneration measures had been distinctive, proportionate, and a part of wider public sector reforms and whether or not judges had entry to efficient judicial cures. The Courtroom’s cautious balancing of nationwide discretion and EU oversight highlights its nuanced method to defending judicial independence, making certain that Member States retain some flexibility in managing budgetary constraints, however by no means on the expense of the elemental values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
Concluding observations
Returning to the query raised within the introduction – to what extent can budgetary restriction measures affecting judges’ remuneration be justified with out crossing the road into violations of the rule of regulation beneath EU regulation? – the joined circumstances C-146/23 and C-374/23 supplied a transparent however fastidiously balanced framework. The Courtroom reaffirmed that whereas budgetary constraints might justify non permanent and proportionate changes to judges’ remuneration, such measures should adhere to strict authorized and procedural safeguards. Critically, any interference should be distinctive, clear, and a part of broader public-sector reforms, making certain that judges stay free from monetary or political pressures.
This judgment accentuates that judicial independence is a elementary European worth deeply rooted in Article 2 and Article 19(1) TEU. Neither Article 2 TEU nor the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, nor every other provision of EU regulation requires Member States to undertake a specific constitutional mannequin governing the relationships and interplay between the assorted branches of the State, specifically as regards the definition and delimitation of their competences. Beneath Article 4(2) TEU, the EU should respect the nationwide identities of the Member States, inherent of their elementary political and constitutional buildings. Nevertheless, in selecting their respective constitutional mannequin, the Member States are required to adjust to their obligations deriving from EU regulation (paras. 45-46).
The Courtroom’s agency place makes clear budgetary justifications don’t grant unchecked energy to change judges’ remuneration in ways in which may compromise judicial independence. Any direct or oblique try to exert management over the judiciary shall be topic to rigorous scrutiny beneath EU regulation. This attitude aligns with the evaluation introduced by Alessandra Silveira, who has persistently emphasised that an issue associated to judicial independence in a Member State is essentially a European downside, since nationwide courts and the CJEU share accountability for making certain the total utility of EU regulation and defending the elemental rights of people throughout the Member States. [8]/[9]/[10]
By strengthening the hyperlink between judicial independence and the total utility of EU regulation, the CJEU has additional consolidated the authorized framework defending the rule of regulation. Judges’ remuneration can’t be manipulated as a instrument of affect, as doing so dangers violating the rule of regulation, weakening nationwide judicial independence, and jeopardising the EU’s constitutional construction. In conclusion, joined circumstances C-146/23 and C-374/23 reaffirm the CJEU’s ongoing position as a guardian of the rule of regulation, solidifying judicial independence as a shared European worth, important to preserving democracy, defending elementary rights, and making certain the total utility of EU regulation.
[1] This attitude was completely developed by Alessandra Silveira in “Tribunais nacionais” in Enciclopédia da União Europeia, ed. Ana Paula Brandão, Francisco Pereira Coutinho, Isabel Camisão, Joana Covelo de Abreu (Braga: Petrony, July 2017), 455-458.
[2] Alessandra Silveira, Joana Abreu, Pedro Froufe, and Sophie Perez, “União de direito para além do direito da União – as garantias de independência judicial no acórdão Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,” Julgar, Might 2018. Out there at http://julgar.pt/uniao-de-direito-para-alem-do-direito-da-uniao-as-garantias-de-independencia-judicial-no-acordao-associacao-sindical-dos-juizes-portugueses/.
[3] Judgment CJEU XL and Others v. Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Lietuvos Respublika, 25 February 2025, case C-146/23, ECLI:EU:C:2025:109.
[4] Judgment CJEU Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, 27 February 2018, case C-64/16 ECLI:EU:C:2018:117.
[5] See Juan Gálvez Galisteo, “7 years of the Portuguese Judges judgment – understanding the place we come from so we all know the place we’re going”, The Official Weblog of UNIO – Pondering and Debating Europe, 15 March 2025, https://officialblogofunio.com/2025/03/15/7-years-of-the-portuguese-judges-judgment-understanding-where-we-come-from-so-we-know-where-we-are-going/.
[6] Judgment Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, para. 46.
[7] Consistent with Advocate Common’s Opinion of 13 June 2024, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku, C-146/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:507, 49.
[8] See Alessandra Silveira, “Horizontal integration and Union based mostly on the rule of regulation” in Estado de Direito na União Europeia, ed. Anabela Miranda Rodrigues, Jónatas Machado, Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Coimbra: Instituto Jurídico da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Coimbra, 2022), 1-12. https://ucpages.uc.pt/website/property/information/873179/ruleoflaw_cap1.pdf.
[9] Alessandra Silveira and Sophie Perez Fernandes, “A Union Primarily based on the Rule of Regulation Past the Scope of EU Regulation – The Ensures Important to Judicial Independence in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,” The Official Weblog of UNIO – Pondering and Debating Europe, 3 April 2018, https://officialblogofunio.com/2018/04/03/a-union-based-on-the-rule-of-law-beyond-the-scope-of-eu-law-the-guarantees-essential-to-judicial-independence-in-associacao-sindical-dos-juizes-portugueses/.
[10] Alessandra Silveira and Joana Abreu, “Evaluation of Portuguese Affiliation of European Regulation’s webinar on the rule of regulation safety within the European Union”, The Official Weblog of UNIO – Pondering and Debating Europe, 14 June 2021, https://officialblogofunio.com/2021/06/14/review-of-portuguese-association-of-european-laws-webinar-on-the-rule-of-law-protection-in-the-european-union.
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