I. Introduction
Sure facets and the (then nonetheless potential) consequence of the ICJ Case regarding Software of the Conference on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in Sudan (Sudan v. United Arab Emirates) had been already mentioned on this weblog right here and right here, together with the difficulty of a potential intervention by third States right here. But, the best way the Courtroom has been coping with (or reasonably has not been coping with) Serbia’s (tried) intervention underneath Artwork. 63 ICJ Statute on this case has to date not been analyzed even if this raises vital points as to the Courtroom’s procedural approaches over time.
II. Serbia’s (tried) intervention in Sudan versus United Arab Emirates
The Sudanese software within the case right here into account was submitted to the Courtroom on March 5, 2025 accompanied by a request for provisional measures of the identical day. On March 28, 2025 the Courtroom knowledgeable the general public by means of a Press Launch that the listening to on the request for provisional measures might be held on April 10, 2005.
On April 24, 2025, i.e. on the time the oral listening to on provisional measures (which was restricted to a single day of pleadings) had already come to an finish, Serbia then submitted a declaration of intervention underneath Artwork. 63 ICJ Statute, as duly famous as soon as once more in a Press Launch of the Courtroom dated April 25, 2025.
In its declaration of intervention Serbia claimed that “reservations to Article IX of the [Genocide] Conference are permissible” (ibid., p. 4) and that Serbia itself (then nonetheless referred to as Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) had entered such a reservation when it acceded to the stated Conference in 2001. (ibid., p. 4-5; see additionally the objections by Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia to stated accession right here at observe 16, in addition to that of Sweden, ibid., at observe 32).
The seemingly (political) background of this intervention was that Sudan had quickly beforehand, i.e. on April 12, 2025, acknowledged Kosovo as an impartial State.
Additionally it is fascinating to notice that within the Case regarding Software of the Conference on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) the Courtroom had already present in its 2008 Judgment on Preliminary Objections that “the FRY [i.e. today Serbia] in 1992 accepted the obligations of that [Genocide] Conference, together with Article IX offering for the jurisdiction of the Courtroom” and {that a} declaration and observe adopted in 1992 within the wake of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (‘SFRY’) “had the impact of a notification of succession by the FRY to the SFRY in relation to the Genocide Conference.” (ibid., p. 45, para. 115). Accordingly, the Courtroom then discovered that “the FRY [i.e. Serbia] in 1992 [had] accepted the obligations of that [Genocide] Conference, together with Article IX offering for the jurisdiction of the Courtroom.” (ibid.). Accordingly, the declare by Serbia, made in its current declaration of intervention within the Sudan versus United Arab Emirates Genocide case, that it isn’t sure by Artwork. IX Genocide Conference, was hardly appropriate with the Courtroom’s prior jurisprudence.
III. Courtroom’s dealing with of Serbia’s tried intervention
However be that as it might, what’s price noting is the best way the Courtroom has been dealing (to date a minimum of) with Serbia’s request to intervene. Aside from the above Press Launch the ICJ has neither talked about, and even much less addressed, Serbia’s tried intervention within the Sudan versus United Arab Emirates proceedings in any official public doc emanating from the Courtroom.
This stands in sharp distinction to the Courtroom’s earlier follow in earlier instances the place the Courtroom, in both a separate order, or within the operative a part of the principle order dismissing an software, has additionally formally dismissed an intervention.
Notably, within the Nuclear Check instances (Australia versus France; New Zealand versus France), the Courtroom on the exact same day it determined by means of judgments that
“the declare of Australia [respectively that of New Zealand] now not has any object and that the Courtroom is due to this fact not referred to as upon to present a choice thereon” (ibid., p. 272; respectively right here, at p. 478),
additionally adopted Orders (see right here, at p. 530 – 531; and right here, at p. 535- 536) wherein it determined that
“1. Whereas by a Judgment of 20 December 1974 on this case the Courtroom finds that the declare of Australia [New Zealand] now not has any object and that the Courtroom is due to this fact not referred to as upon to present a choice thereon,
2. Whereas in consequence there’ll now not be any proceedings earlier than the Courtroom to which the Software for permission to intervene may relate,
Unanimously,
Finds that the Software of the Authorities of Fiji for permission to intervene within the proceedings instituted by Australia towards France lapses, and that no additional motion thereon is named for on the a part of the Courtroom. (…)”
Accordingly, a proper choice to terminate the intervention proceedings had been thought of vital by the Courtroom even the place the principle case to which the intervention associated had come to an finish.
Mutatis mutandis in the identical vein, albeit considerably in a different way procedure-wise, the Courtroom in 1995, when coping with the Request for an Examination of the State of affairs in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Courts Judgment of 20 December 1974 within the Nuclear Exams (New Zealand v. France) Case included within the operative a part of its Order dismissing the principle request by New Zealand a separate paragraph additionally dismissing the varied requests respectively declarations of intervention. The Courtroom then accordingly discovered
“(…) that the ’Software for Permission to Intervene’ submitted by Australia on 23 August 1995, and the ‘Functions for Permission to Intervene’ and ‘Declarations of Intervention’ submitted by Samoa and Solomon Islands on 24 August 1995, and by the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia on 25 August 1995, should likewise be dismissed.”
In sharp distinction thereto, within the current Sudan versus United Arab Emirates case, nevertheless, the Courtroom has (a minimum of to date) neither adopted a separate order bringing to an finish Serbia’s standing as a potential intervener, nor has the Courtroom included within the operative a part of (nor in any respect in) its Order of Could 5, 2025 terminating the principle proceedings any reference or choice as to the destiny of Serbia’s intervention.
It goes with out saying {that a} request to intervene or a declaration of intervention, as being an incidental continuing, can’t face up to a dismissal of the principle case, such dismissal being adopted both for a (manifest) lack of jurisdiction or in any other case. But, evidently the earlier follow of the Courtroom, as detailed above, confirms that this outcome that the intervention is thereby additionally been dropped at an finish must be formally determined by the Courtroom, or on the very least be formally famous, be it just for the sake of authorized readability and transparency. Additionally it is such follow solely that may information different States when considering intervening in contentious proceedings.
Equally, one would additionally anticipate the Courtroom to formally acknowledge at an acceptable second the choice by a State to withdraw an software for permission to intervene or a declaration of intervention (or certainly different incidental proceedings), given the procedural results such withdrawals may carry with them at some later stage, e.g. when an try could be made to later ‘withdraw’ such a earlier withdrawal.
